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Abstract
In recent years vote matching websites, increasingly referred to as 
voting  advice  applications  (VAAs)  have  been  deployed  in  numerous 
countries with the purported objective of aiding prospective voters in 
their electoral choice. Used during first order electoral contests, 
such as general elections, as well as in less salient regional and 
local elections, the phenomenon is spawning an emergent literature on 
the pros and cons of such tools. This paper contributes to the debate 
on the design effects of VAAs by critically evaluating some of their 
underlying assumptions -in particular the world view that determines 
how  policy  preferences  are  aggregated  to  produce  voting 
recommendations. The core of the analysis focuses on the relative 
performance  of  various  algorithms.  The  findings  suggest  that  the 
algorithms inside the 'black box' are not design neutral. This has 
implications not only for the choice of algorithm but also for how VAA 
results ought to be conveyed to the public. 
Fernando Mendez
University of Zürich
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Voting Advice Applications1 (VAAs) have enjoyed a growing popularity 
across Europe in recent years. During some of the most successful 
deployments of VAA's in an electoral setting millions of citizens have 
been issued with so-called voting 'recommendations' (Marschall 2008; 
Ladner  and  Pianzola  2010).  The  proliferation  of  such  tools  is 
therefore of special interest to political scientists and researchers 
investigating the impact of new technologies on society and politics. 
Reflecting this interest, a growing literature has emerged around the 
promises and possible problems with VAAs (see Cedroni and Garzia 2010 
for  a  recent review).  This paper  contributes  to  these  debates  by 
addressing various methodological aspects related to the design of 
VAAs. Specifically, it focuses on the issue of how voters' policy 
preferences are aggregated to produce measures of concordance with 
parties/candidates. In other words, the paper deals with the core 
function of a VAA. 
The following section begins by providing some background on 
VAAs and an account of the 'world view' that underpins their design. 
This  provides  the  basis  for  discussing  four  VAA  models  based  on 
competing algorithms. In section 3 the datasets generated by five VAA 
experiments are described. It also discusses the methodology used for 
testing the various VAA algorithms. Section 4 presents the results of 
an  empirical  test  of  the  four  VAA  models.  The  discussion  in  the 
concluding  section  then  relates  the  analysis  to  questions  of  VAA 
further design and development. 
1 For purposes of simplicity I shall employ the term VAA throughout the rest 
of this paper, though I believe the academic community should consider as a 
less loaded term for this generic type of application.
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2 VAAs: What they do and how they view the voter
The idea behind VAAs is to allow citizens to better define their own 
subjective, political preferences and to match these with the stated 
(or academically coded) preferences of candidates or political parties 
that are stored on the online application. Around 30 policy items are 
typically included in a VAA although in some cases such as the Swiss 
smarvote it can be up to around 60. The core output of most VAAs is 
usually  a  concordance/similarity  score  between  the  user  and  the 
parties/candidates  across  the  30-odd  policy  statements.  Preference 
matching therefore lies at the core of a VAA even though many of the 
sites add extra layers of graphical visualisation. Common additional 
graphical  features  include  mapping  on  an  X,Y  scatterplot  the  two 
dimensions that are widely held to define the issue space in most 
Western democracies – social liberalism versus social conservativism 
on the one hand, and economic left versus economic right on the other 
(sometimes referred to as GAL/TAN, (see e.g. Hooghe et al 2002)). In 
some VAAs there is an additional mapping of multiple dimensions using 
a radar charts (sometimes referred to as Spider graphs). 
I leave the accuracy of multi-dimensional mapping to one side in 
this paper, whilst acknowledging that there is good reason to believe 
that  this  too  raises  a  number  of  methodological  concerns  about 
accuracy (Louwerse and Rosema 2011; Gemenis forthcoming). Also design 
issues related to statement formulation (Walgrave et al 2009) and 
party coding (Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2009; Gemenis forthcoming) are 
outside  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Instead  I  shall  concentrate 
exclusively on what is usually the core output for most VAAs: the rank 
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ordering  of  party/candidates  in  terms  of  concordance/similarity 
scores.  
What,  then,  is  the  'world  view'  of  the  citizen  voter  that 
informs a VAA and by extension its recommendation? The short answer is 
that VAA design is predicated on a rational model of how a voter 
decides  that  goes  back  to  Downs'  influential  economic  theory  of 
democracy (Downs 1957). The voter is assumed to compare his/her stance 
with that of the candidates on all of the issues. The voter then 
aggregates his/her preferences on the different issues and votes for 
the  candidate  which  offers,  on  balance,  the  largest  number  of 
preferred policies. Over the years these ideas about 'issue voting' 
have been formalized into a spatial theory of electoral choice. 
It is useful to note the underlying assumptions of the spatial 
models since they have a direct influence on the theoretical basis of 
a VAA. The key feature of these models of electoral choice is that 
each voter can be represented by a point on a hypothetical space which 
reflects the voter's ideal set of policies and that the policy 
position of each party/candidate can also be represented on that same 
space (Westholm 1997; Tomz and Houweling 2008). A voter chooses the 
party/candidate whose policy position is closest to theirs. Variants 
of this approach to electoral choice are called 'proximity models' and 
such models form the theoretical core of existing VAA models. In such 
a rationalistic model there is little scope for sociological / 
psychological factors such as party identification to determine voter 
choice or for valence factors such as the perceived competence of a 
candidate/party to deliver the desired goals -all of which have 
informed alternative theories of voting behaviour. 
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A crucial distinction  can thus be made between a) so-called 
'issue-voters' whose vote choice is based on the policy stance of a 
candidate/party  on  a  given  set  of  policy  issues  and  b)  non-issue 
voters whose vote choice is based on other factors. This distinction 
will be crucial to the rest of the paper and the analysis conducted in 
the empirical sections. This distinction is graphically represented in 
figure 1. The dotted line shows the VAA world view – a view that is 
predicated on a particular variant of issue voting theory.  VAAs are 
therefore ill-suited to psychological/sociological models of voting 
such  as  those  based  on  factors  like  party  identification  or 
charismatic leadership. Indeed, VAA models are also not suited to 
other rational models of voting included in figure 1.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
Even accepting the issue voting assumption behind VAAs, there 
are still two prominent theories of issue voting. The classic model of 
issue voting -the proximity model- has already been mentioned. The 
other  theory  of  issue-voting  is  the  directional  model  (originally 
formulated in Rabinowitz et al 1989). The key difference between the 
two  models  relates  to  how  a  policy  dimension  is  conceptualised 
(Westholm 1997; Tomz and Houweling 2008; Lacy and Paolino 2010). In 
the proximity model what matters most is the distance between the 
policy alternatives whereas in the directional model what matters most 
is to be on the correct 'side' of the argument.  The directional 
assumption is that voters do not discriminate between fine policy 
gradations but are more concerned with the direction or the side of 
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the argument on a particular policy issue. 
The differences between the two models of issue voting can be 
seen in figure 2.2 In the health policy example in figure 2, proximity 
models and directional models predict different behaviour from the 
voter, represented by the letter V. According to proximity theory the 
voter would prefer candidate B since it is closer to the voter's 
position. In the directional model, however, the voter would prefer 
candidate A, since both A and V are on the same side of the argument. 
The zero point represents a neutral point, once it is crossed one is 
on  a  different  side  of  the  argument.  In  sum,  and  as  the  figure 
suggests, the two theories generate competing predictions about vote 
choice (this is a topic to which I shall return in section 3).
[Insert figure 2 about here]
In  addition  to  competing  theories  of  behaviour  there  is  a 
question -especially relevant to VAAs- of which metric to use for 
calculating distances. In terms of the metrics based on a proximity 
model, two different metrics, a  Euclidean distance or a City Block 
distance, can be used. For the directional model of issue voting an 
alternative  metric  has  been  proposed  based  on  the  Scalar  Product 
measure (Rabinowitz et al 1989). These metrics provide for at least 
three different algorithms that can be used in a VAA. To the best of 
our knowledge most VAA models have used the City Block metric rather 
than the Euclidean distance. The difference between the two methods 
for calculating proximity is that the city block metric is based on a 
calculation of the sum of the absolute differences between voter and 
2 I use the example originally formulated by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989)
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party on each issue, whilst the Euclidean metric is based on the 
square of the differences between voter and party on each issue. 3 
The differences can be illustrated rather neatly in matrix form. 
Consider the following similarity matrix based on City Block logic:
[
CA A N D CD
CA 1 0 .5 0 −0 .5 −1
A 0 .5 1 0 .5 0 −0 .5
N 0 0 .5 1 0 .5 0
D −0 .5 0 0 .5 1 0 .5
CD −1 −0.5 0 0 .5 1
]
The headings in the columns and rows are based a five-point Likert 
scale with the following answer categories: Completely Agree (CA); 
Agree (A); Neither Agree nor Disagree (N); Disagree (D); Completely 
Disagree (CD). The numbers in the cells of the matrix represent the 
points assigned for a 'hit' by the VAA algorithm when a voter (rows) 
and a candidate (columns) land in one of the possible cells for each 
policy statement. The scale ranges from -1 to +1. Excluding the 'no 
opinion'  answer  categories  from  the  matrix,  this  results  in  25 
possible combinations or 'matches' (i.e. 52). The distances are scaled 
so that the maximum distance, e.g a completely agree by a voter and a 
completely disagree by a candidate, equals -1 whereas a perfect match, 
e.g. completely agree by both voter and candidate equals 1. In short, 
the similarity coefficient will vary from -1 for complete disagreement 
to +1 for complete agreement. The overall similarity coefficient is 
3 Technically, there is a difference between the Euclidean distance and a 
Euclidean squared distance. In the former case, distance is calculated by 
the square root of the sum of the squared differences for each issue. The 
additional square root transformation need not concern us for this paper 
since it does not affect the order in which candidates/parties are ranked 
by a VAA (see methodology discussion in section 3). 
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given by summing the total number of hits and dividing by the total 
number of items answered.
Having presented the City Block matrix we can now take a look at 
the logic of alternative algorithms for calculating similarity scores. 
The  following matrices  present the corresponding  similarity scores 
assigned to each cell based on Euclidean (proximity logic) or Scalar 
Product (directional logic) and an additional algorithm inspired by 
directional  theory  which  is  referred  to  as  an  Hybrid  model.  A 
Euclidean4 similarity matrix is given by the following:
 
[
CA A N D CD
CA 1 0.875 0 .5 −0 .125 −1
A 0 .875 1 0 .875 0 .5 −0 .125
N 0 .5 0.875 1 0 .875 0 .5
D −0 .125 0.5 0 . 875 1 0 .875
CD −1 −0.125 0 .5 0 .875 1
]
The directional model based on a Scalar Product metric is given by the 
following matrix:
[
CA A N D CD
CA 1 0 .5 0 −0 .5 −1
A 0 .5 0 .25 0 −0 .25 −0.5
N 0 0 0 0 0
D −0 .5 −0.25 0 0 .25 0 .5
CD −1 −0.5 0 0 .5 1
]
4 To see how the values in the matrix cells were derived consider a five-
point Likert scale with the following values CA=1, A=2; N=3, D=4, and CD=5. 
The maximimum distance is 4 (i.e. the difference between CA and CD is 5-1). 
The next maximum distance is 3 (5-2) and so on. The square of the maximum 
distance is 16 (4x4), the second maximum distance is 9 (3x3) and so on for 
each cell. The matrix simply rescales the Euclidean distances so that they 
range from -1 to +1, rather than from 0-16.
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Lastly, a fourth model is introduced inspired by directional logic and 
referred to as the Hybrid model: 
[
CA A N D CD
CA 1 0.5 0 −0 .5 −1
A 0 .5 0.625 0 .25 −0 .125 −0 .5
N 0 0.25 0 .5 0 .25 0
D −0 .5 −0.125 0 .25 0 .625 0 .5
CD −1 −0.5 0 0 .5 1
]
Essentially,  the  Hybrid  model  simply  splits  the  difference 
between the City Block proximity model and the directional model based 
on the Scalar Product matrices above. A key difference is illustrated 
by looking at the respective scores attached to a match on 'neither 
agree nor disagree' by a voter (row) and a candidate (column). In the 
Hybrid model the score of 0.5 is half way between the Scalar Product 
score (0 points) and the proximity model (1 point). Indeed, the 0.5 
score for a match in the 'neither agree nor disagree' cell captures 
the intuition that  prospective voters/candidates can see both sides 
of the argument on a given issue statement. A further difference in 
the  Hybrid  model  is  that  it  aims  to  capture  the  intensity  of  a 
preference.  This  can  be  gleaned  by  comparing  a  match  in  the 
'agree/agree'  cell  compared  to  'completely  agree/completely  agree' 
cell in both tables. In short, the Hybrid model conceives the middle 
category differently whilst also taking intensity of preferences into 
account. The more intense the preference, the higher the match on a 
given policy question. 
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3 Description of the experiments, data and empirical test
In the period between October 2010 and May 2012 the research team 
deployed a VAA during five electoral contests. Two of the contests 
were conducted for Presidential elections that took place in Latin 
America, Brazil in October 2010 and Peru in April 2011, whilst the 
other three elections were for Parliamentary elections held in Europe, 
Scotland in May 2011, Cyprus in May 2011, and most recently, Greece in 
May 2012.5 Thus in the two Latin America Presidential races VAA users 
were matched with candidates whereas in the three European cases they 
were matched with political parties. In all cases the research team 
partnered with election studies experts from the countries in drawing 
up the 30 item questionnaire and in coding the candidates/parties. 6 
In  section  2  we  identified  four  VAA  algorithms  based  on 
different  theories  and  metrics.  Two  proximity  models  based  on  a 
Euclidean metric and a City Block metric and two directional inspired 
models based on the Scalar Product metric and a Hybrid metric. In 
terms of testing these VAA models and their performance across the 
five electoral settings there are four main steps to the analysis:
Step 1: The first step involved the selection of candidates/parties to 
be  used.  We  opted  for  a  common  criterion:  to  only  consider 
candidates/parties  that  crossed  the  five  per  cent  vote  share 
5 The results of the Greek elections in May 2012 failed to deliver a 
government and a new elections was held the following month, June 2012. 
6 In terms of coding the policy positions of the candidates/parties on the 30 
issue statements included in the VAA a preliminary coding was carried out 
by the relevant research teams. Candidates/parties were then invited to 
check their assigned policy positions and were able to 'correct' codes 
where justified. Quite uniquely amongst all VAA experiments thus far, in 
the Peru case the five leading presidential candidates actually filled in 
the questionnaire themselves. In other cases, such as Scotland, the codes 
were also checked by party headquarters or by leading political journalists 
(Wheatley et al forthcoming).
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threshold. This threshold was chosen largely on pragmatic grounds. To 
begin with marginal parties were not always included in every VAA 
experiment given the difficulties involved in coding them on all the 
policy issues. Furthermore, using a different threshold, say 4 or 3 
per cent, would have resulted in only one extra party being included, 
the  Scottish  Green  Party  -a  party  which  did  not  compete  in  the 
constituency  vote  for  the  Scottish  elections.  Because  of  these 
factors, as well as the typically low number of respondents supporting 
some of the very marginal parties (see additional criteria below), a 
common five per cent threshold was used across the five electoral 
settings. 
Step 2: involved identifying committed voters with a specific vote 
intention.  This  could  be  done  quite  easily  since  all  the  VAA 
experiments included a set of questions on vote intention that were 
asked  before the results were produced.7 By filtering out 'floating 
voters' it was possible to create a dataset of respondents whose vote 
intention was for one of the candidates/parties that had crossed the 5 
percent vote share threshold. Interestingly, in all five VAA settings 
a large proportion of respondents did not actually specify a vote 
intention for any of the candidates/parties. Another question that was 
asked before the VAA results were displayed was the reason  why a 
respondent would vote for a particular candidate/party. In addition to 
issue voting, a range of answer options were included such as party 
identification, charismatic leadership, perceptions of competence and 
clientalism. It was thus straightforward to create a binary variable, 
7 Designing the VAA system in this way avoids the need to rely on respondents 
filling in an additional opt-in survey (and the additional selection bias 
that this would entail).
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issue-voter or non-issue voter, for each respondent in the dataset. 
Step 3: involves comparing the performance of each algorithm in terms 
of  matching  respondents  with  their  preferred  candidate/party.  All 
algorithms assign a coefficient of similarity between the respondent 
and every candidate/party. It is therefore possible to generate a rank 
order of candidates/parties for each respondent based on their vote 
intention.  We  assign  a  rank  of  1  if  the  highest  coefficient  is 
assigned to the respondent's chosen candidate/party, a rank of 2 if it 
is  the  second  highest  coefficient,  and  so  on.  Also,  if  two 
candidates/parties,  including  the  respondent's  preferred  one,  rank 
equal first, we assign a rank of 1.5, if they rank equal second, we 
assign a rank of 2.5 and so on. 
The empirical test is to see how well the four VAA models can 
'correctly' rank respondents' chosen candidate/party. The closer to 1 
the mean rank, the better the performance of the VAA algorithm since a 
score of 1 would mean that the VAA model 'correctly' ranked in first 
place the candidate/party of all respondents that had the same vote 
intention. Conversely, the lowest possible score will depend on the 
number of candidates/parties above the five per cent threshold in a 
given electoral contest.  Where there are five candidates (as in Peru) 
the lowest possible score is 5, which would occur if the VAA model 
ranked a users' candidate choice last, i.e. fifth in the Peru case. 
Step 4: involves repeating step 3 but on a reduced number of policy 
items.  The reason for  this is that some of  the  policy items may 
introduce noise to the overall results. Whilst all 30 policy items may 
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appear important to VAA designers launching the application, post-
election analysis is likely to reveal that not all items mattered 
equally.  By  analysing  the  VAA  generated  datasets  in  terms  of  the 
dimensionality of the political space they represent, it is possible 
to reduce the 30 dimensional issue space (i.e. the 30 policy items) 
to a lower dimensional space. Here I rely on a method used by Wheatley 
et  al  (forthcoming)  which  involves  extracting  dimensions  from  VAA 
generated  datasets  through  factor  analysis  and  then  performing  a 
Mokken test of scalability on the extracted dimensions. The end result 
of extracting Mokken scales is a reduced set of core policy items that 
define the political space. The number of items included in the Mokken 
scales range from 9 items for Peru; 12 items for Brazil; 14 items for 
Scotland; 17 items for Cyprus; and 20 items for Greece.
Before turning to the results it is necessary to briefly mention 
the nature of the datasets generated by VAAs. The datasets typically 
produced can be large, and our five experiments were no exception. It 
is crucial to point out that not all data entries are relevant for our 
analysis. VAA sites can receive many visitors, for instance around 
100, 000 in the case of Peru and Greece or over 7,000 in the case of 
Cyprus. It is worth pointing that in Cyprus the electorate is just 
over 500,000. But not all database entries can be considered 'valid' 
for analysing the questions dealt with in this paper. Typically many 
users may enter repeated entries, or they may get 'bored' towards the 
end of the questionnaire, and many do not additional data (such as 
party  affiliation  or  their  vote  intention).  Various  safeguards  to 
screen out rogue entries such as item response timers or identifiers 
for multiple entries from the same web browser have been devised. We 
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have preferred to err on the side of caution in terms of identifying 
potentially rogue entries and the end result is usually a much reduced 
dataset of 'core' users who are more likely to have provided valid 
entries. The dataset is nonetheless large with over 70,000 respondents 
with a vote intention for the 23 candidates/parties that crossed the 
five per cent threshold for each election (see table 1). 
[Insert table 1 about here]
4 Analysis and Results
As noted in the section above, our focus is on the actual rank order 
produced  by  a  VAA  algorithm  rather  than  the  precise  coefficient 
(concordance score). What is likely to matter most for an issue driven 
VAA  respondent  with  a  clear  vote  intention  is  where  their 
candidate/party is placed. The crucial VAA question is this: Which 
candidate/party is ranked first? 
Let us begin by examining if the data reveal differences between 
issue voters and non-issue voters by comparing the rank scores of the 
two  types  of  respondents  when  they  have  expressed  the  same 
candidate/party vote intention. Given that a core part of the argument 
being advanced rests on issue voters it is expected that the overall 
scores of non-issue voters, i.e. those respondents who base their vote 
choice on matters not necessarily connected to the policy positions of 
candidates/parties, to be less consistent than issue voters. Much as 
expected, the average rank generated by the four algorithms across the 
23 candidates/parties were better on average for issue-voters than 
they were for  non-issue voters.  In table 2, the  closer to  1 the 
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average  rank  for  respondents  whose  vote  intention  was  for  a 
party/candidate in the rows, the better the score.   
[Insert table 2 about here]
It is important to stress that the results of table 2 relate to 
how well the VAA models perform in terms of ranking respondents with 
the  same candidate/party  vote intention.  Of  the  184  cells  in  the 
results matrix (23 candidates/parties x 2 types of voters x 4 VAA 
models) there are only three cells where the average rank of non-issue 
voters is marginally better than for issue voters (in bold). This was 
the  case  with  the  Cypriot  party,  Diko,  and  with  the  Peruvian 
presidential  candidate, Castañeda. Except  for  these  outlier cases, 
issue voters were more consistent than non-issue voters in terms of 
the rankings produced by the various VAA models. We have reasonable 
support for the argument that issue voters using VAAs appear to be 
more consistent in terms of the congruence of their policy positions 
and their vote intention.8 For the remainder of the paper, therefore, 
I shall concentrate most of our attention on issue voters. How well do 
the various algorithms perform in terms of 'correctly' placing this 
group of core voters? 
 
[Insert tables 3 and 4 about here]
Table 3 reports the average performance of the four models for 
8 A t test reveals that there is a statistically significant differences 
between the two groups of respondents but these are not reported since the 
focus of this paper is not on the actual coefficients produced -but rather 
the predictive power of the models in correctly ranking issue voters 
party/candidate choice.   
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each of the elections. As with the earlier table, the closer to 1 the 
final score, the better the predictive performance of the respective 
algorithm. The table shows that the directional inspired models (based 
on  the  Scalar  Product  or  the  Hybrid  algorithm)  outperformed  the 
proximity models (based on Euclidean or City Block algorithms) in 
ranking  issue  voters'  preferred  candidate/party  across  all  five 
electoral settings. The Hybrid model came first in three electoral 
settings and equal first alongside the Scalar Product algorithm the 
remaining  two  elections.  However,  the  Scalar  Product  performed 
comparatively worse in the case of Cyprus, coming last. In table 4 we 
report the average rank performance of the four algorithms for non 
issue voters. Not surprisingly, the overall scores are worse and in 
the hypothesized direction (i.e. higher) across all models.
[Insert table 10 about here]
Tables 5 and 6 presents the results of a slightly different 
test. The aim is to see whether the same results hold if the focus is 
only  on  the  first  ranked  party/candidate.  Note  that  we  are  here 
concentrating  solely  on  the  proportion  of  first  placed 
parties/candidates and not assigning further points to other ranks. 
Thus, the higher the percentage, the better the predictive power of 
the algorithm. The table presents the average for each of the four 
models across the five settings. Again, we find that the Hybrid model 
performed best across all settings. 
Using all 30 policy items the directional inspired algorithms 
seem to perform better in terms of correctly assigning respondents to 
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their preferred party/candidate. Crucially, this is the case for the 
important subset of respondents that are at the core of our analysis 
-issue voters. The results hold whether we focus on first placed or 
use a more refined average rank order measure. In tables 7 and 8 the 
results of the Mokken-based scales are presented. Note that in these 
cases  all  items  that  were  unscalable  using  a  Mokken  test  of 
scalability were excluded,9 which reduced the policy space to a core 
set of items. We find the results to be largely consistent with those 
reported based on the broader 30 policy items. Table 7 focuses on the 
average of the rank order performance where we find that the Hybrid 
model performs best in four out of the five elections, and second to 
the Scalar Product in the case of Peru. A similar picture emerges with 
regard to issue-voters correctly assigned in first place to their 
preferred party/candidate in table 8. Again we find that the Hybrid 
algorithm outperforms the other models.
5 Discussion
The VAA phenomenon appears to be spreading beyond its former home in 
Western Europe to other countries across the globe. In some European 
countries the number of 'voting recommendations' produced have the 
potential  to  conceivably  affect  electoral  outcomes.  In  response, 
political scientists have begun to critically evaluate methodological 
issues that are raised in the design of VAAs. In this paper we raised 
the problem of the competing theoretical models upon which VAAs could 
be built and the various competing metrics that they give rise to: a 
proximity model based on a City Block metric (the most common method) 
or a Euclidean distance, and a directional model based on a Scalar 
9 The Mokken scalability coefficient (Hi ) was set at 0.3 and alpha =0.05. 
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Product metric. We also introduced a so-called Hybrid model that takes 
into account both the 'side of the argument' and the 'intensity' of 
preferences on a given policy statement. We then set up an empirical 
test to examine the performance of the four VAA models based on data 
generated by five real-world experiments. The basic claim is that the 
directional  inspired  models  performed  better  than  proximity  based 
algorithms. 
The results presented in this paper with regard to directional 
algorithms should not be viewed as a call for using the Scalar Product 
(the metric used in directional theory) as a model for a VAA design. 
Such a metric, I believe, is not particularly well suited to a VAA. 
Other  things  being  equal  the  metric  would,  for  example,  tend  to 
consistently match a moderate right leaning voter with a more extreme 
right  party  across  a  given  set  of  policy  items.  Nonetheless, 
directional theory does point to two factors -being on the 'correct 
side of the argument' and the intensity of preferences- that could be 
important for a VAA design, especially when based on a five-point 
Likert scale that includes a middle category. These two elements were 
incorporated into the Hybrid model, which tended to outperform the 
other  models  in  terms  of  being  a  better  predictor  of  the  vote 
intention of issue voters.  
Evidently, these results are based on but one of a variety of 
tests that could be used to potentially adjudicate between competing 
algorithms.  Many  other  tests  will  no  doubt  be  performed  on  the 
datasets produced by VAAs. What is likely to emerge from the resulting 
research is that there is no  single best way to aggregate policy 
preferences to produce a voting recommendation. This holds even if VAA 
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designers base their algorithms on a proximity model. A Euclidean 
metric  and  City  Block  metric  will  generate  different  similarity 
coefficients  as  well  as  rank  ordering  of  parties/candidates.  This 
suggests  that  to  the  extent  that  a  voting  recommendation  can  be 
produced it must be treated with some degree of scepticism – much will 
depend on institutional factors, such as the type of electoral system, 
the structure of political competition, and the number of effective 
parties included in a VAA, the coding of parties, as well as design 
issues  concerning  the  type  of  answer  scales  used  and  how  middle 
categories and 'no opinions' are treated. Many of these issues have 
been beyond the scope of this paper but further research is likely to 
be  conducted in  this  direction.  Instead,  we  have  argued  that VAA 
designers' choice of algorithm -i.e. the one that goes into the 'black 
box'- is not necessarily neutral. Because of this, and the fact that 
different  metrics  can  produced  different  rank  ordering  of 
parties/candidates, VAA designers may be well advised to dispense with 
the concept of a voting 'recommendation' altogether. At a minimum, 
efforts should be made to 'qualify' the results produced by VAAs to 
the public using these websites.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Theoretical linkages in mainstream models of voting
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Figure 2: Directional and proximity models of issue-voter
Note: A and B are candidate positions, V refers to the voter's position on the issue statement
Source: Rabinowtiz and Macdonald (1989)
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Table 1: Number of users that expressed a vote intention for one of the candidates/parties that 
crossed the five per cent vote share threshold
Country Party/candidate Type of voter Number of respondents 
Brazil Dilma Issue 1374 
Non-issue 2228 
Serra Issue 1052 
Non-Issue 2858 
Marina Issue 2285 
Non-Issue 2238 
Cyprus Akel Issue 678 
Non-Issue 243 
Dissy Issue 595 
Non-Issue 686 
Diko Issue 173 
Non-Issue 144 
Edek Issue 149 
Non-Issue 114 
Greece Pasok Issue 405 
Non-Issue 1262 
New Democracy Issue 658 
Non-Issue 1050 
KKE Issue 937 
Non-Issue 1197 
Syriza Issue 3133 
Non-Issue 2506 
Dimar Issue 1067 
Non-Issue 1469 
Ind. Greeks Issue 1591 
Non-Issue 1978 
Golden Dawn Issue 452 
Non-Issue 1559 
Peru Toledo Issue 1774 
Non-Issue 3817 
Fujimori Issue 492 
Non-Issue 993 
Castañeda Issue 347 
Non-Issue 1471 
Kuczynski Issue 6029 
Non-Issue 13506 
Humala Issue 1262 
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Non-Issue 1105 
Scotland SNP Issue 1234 
Non-Issue 2694 
Labour Issue 964 
Non-Issue 1119 
Tory Issue 481 
Non-Issue 391 
Libdem Issue 560 
Non-Issue 343 
Total number of respondents 72663
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Table 2: Average rank performance of issue voters versus non-issue voters across algorithms
Country Party/candidate Type of 
voter
Euclid City Block Scalar Product Hybrid 
Brazil Dilma Issue 1.2 1.33 1.77 1.46 
Non-Issue 1.31 1.45 1.88 1.59 
Serra Issue 1.61 1.69 1.69 1.66 
Non-Issue 1.66 1.72 1.74 1.68 
Marina Issue 2.09 1.9 1.37 1.71 
Non-Issue 2.19 2 1.42 1.8 
Cyprus Akel Issue 1.4 1.37 1.03 1.15 
Non-Issue 2.22 2.1 1.16 1.64 
Dissy Issue 2.7 2.6 1.83 2.36 
Non-Issue 2.82 2.74 2.05 2.55 
Diko Issue 1.56 1.7 2.42 1.84 
Non-Issue 1.58 1.68 2.54 1.89 
Edek Issue 1.32 1.34 1.78 1.41 
Non-Issue 1.55 1.58 2.01 1.64 
Greece Pasok Issue 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.69 
Non-Issue 2.07 2.05 2.1 2.03 
New Democracy Issue 1.88 1.94 2.08 2 
Non-Issue 2.19 2.19 2.45 2.3 
KKE Issue 2.16 2.04 1.74 1.86 
Non-Issue 3.27 3.12 2.36 2.74 
Syriza Issue 2.62 2.56 1.71 2.2 
Non-Issue 3.32 3.28 2.16 2.86 
Dimar Issue 1.83 1.88 2.32 1.97 
Non-Issue 2.12 2.19 2.66 2.29 
Ind. Greeks Issue 1.87 2.01 2.52 2.19 
Non-Issue 2.01 2.17 2.67 2.37 
Golden Dawn Issue 2.14 2.07 2.1 2.06 
Non-Issue 2.39 2.35 2.3 2.33 
Peru Toledo Issue 1.73 1.93 2.62 2.01 
Non-Issue 1.84 2.01 2.76 2.1 
Fujimori Issue 2.05 1.77 2.33 1.84 
Non-Issue 2.12 1.87 2.4 1.94 
Castañeda Issue 2.62 3 3.55 3.31 
Non-Issue 2.62 3.01 3.5 3.27 
Kuczynski Issue 4.14 3.88 1.67 3.14 
Non-Issue 4.38 4.15 1.82 3.48 
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Humala Issue 1.43 1.36 1.41 1.3 
Non-Issue 1.53 1.45 1.52 1.39 
Scotland SNP Issue 1.66 1.6 1.4 1.48 
Non-Issue 1.99 1.93 1.67 1.8 
Labour Issue 1.89 1.92 2.24 2.05 
Non-Issue 1.96 1.99 2.39 2.13 
Conservative Issue 1.77 1.73 1.15 1.39 
Non-Issue 2.19 2.12 1.29 1.66 
LibDem Issue 1.23 1.31 1.76 1.45 
Non-Issue 1.29 1.43 1.98 1.59
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Table 3: Issue voters overall scores for each election
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 Performer
Brazil 1.63 1.64 1.61 1.61 Scalar /Hybrid
Cyprus 1.74 1.75 1.76 1.69 Hybrid
Greece 2.031 2.032 2.029 1.996 Hybrid
Peru 2.39 2.39 2.31 2.31 Scalar/Hybrid
Scotland 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.59 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
Table 4: Non issue voters overall scores for each election
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 Performer
Brazil 1.72 1.72 1.68 1.69 Scalar
Cyprus 2.04 2.03 1.94 1.93 Hybrid
Greece 2.48 2.48 2.39 2.42 Scalar
Peru 2.50 2.5 2.4 2.44 Scalar
Scotland 1.86 1.87 1.83 1.79 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
Table 5: Issue voters correctly ranked in first place 
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 performer
Brazil 53.1 50 49.6 53.8 Hybrid
Cyprus 50.6 49.6 50.8 53.3 Hybrid
Greece 47.2 46.6 47.2 49.5 Hybrid
Peru 37.2 37.1 35.8 39.2 Hybrid
Scotland 58.4 57.4 59.9 62 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
Table 6: Non issue voters correctly ranked in first place 
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 performer
Brazil 48.6 44.6 46.2 49.1 Hybrid
Cyprus 36.9 37 44.5 43 Scalar
Greece 36.2 35.1 37.4 38.2 Hybrid
Peru 34.5 33.9 33.9 35.2 Hybrid
Scotland 47.3 47.1 50.2 52.1 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
Table 7: Issue voters overall scores for each election (Mokken items) 
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 Performer
Brazil 1.743 1.716 1.694 1.691 Hybrid
Cyprus 1.707 1.711 1.789 1.678 Hybrid
Greece 2.023 2.020 2.032 1.995 Hybrid
Peru 2.596 2.575 2.489 2.544 Scalar
Scotland 1.623 1.631 1.643 1.595 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
Table 8: Issue voters correctly ranked in first place  (Mokken items)
Country Euclid City Block Scalar Hybrid Best
 performer
Brazil 45.5 46.7 44.6 49.3 Hybrid
Cyprus 50.5 47.2 48.8 54 Hybrid
Greece 47.6 46.5 47 49.8 Hybrid
Peru 31.5 29.7 30.6 32.8 Hybrid
Scotland 58.8 57.5 59.2 62.1 Hybrid
Note: Best scores for each election in bold
